

4 September 1964

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SPECIAL REPORT

CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL AFRICA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL AFRICA

Communist China, although a relatively new force in Africa, has moved quickly to expand its influence and enlarge its presence there. Fourteen embassies—nearly a third of all Peiping's missions abroad—have been established on the continent. Two of the most recent and rapidly expanding embassies are in the Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi, the primary staging areas for dissident activities in the neighboring Congo (Leopold-ville).

The Chinese are always eager to capitalize on chaos wherever it will redound to the detriment of the West. Chinese diplomats have been in contact with rebel leaders in both Brazzaville and Bujumbura. Chinese propaganda and guerrilla warfare manuals have been found in rebel hands. Moral support, funds, and considerable advice have been given to Congolese rebels, and a number of them have apparently traveled to Peiping for political and military training.

The fact remains, however, that government control in the eastern Congo largely collapsed from within. The Chinese have unquestionably contributed an element of sophistication to insurgent activity, but rebel successes have a momentum of their own. The Chinese have been in Brazzaville and Bujumbura less than nine months, and the Congo has been in ferment for years. On balance, though the Chinese have sharply increased their involvement in the central African scene, their efforts to date appear relatively modest. Peiping's attempts to influence the course of events have had some effect but are not at this point a decisive factor in the complex Congo equation.

Chinese Activities in Brazzaville

In a joint communiqué on 22 February 1964, Peiping and Brazzaville announced agreement to establish diplomatic relations. This was the first former French colony to renounce Taipei after De Gaulle's recognition of Communist China. From the start, the establishment of formal relations has afforded Peiping easy access to both the Kwilu rebel leader Mulele and the National Liberation Committee

1



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(CNL), the left-wing exile group that fled from Leopold-ville in September 1963.

The first Chinese diplomats arrived in March 1964 and
the embassy staff grew rapidly.
At present there are reported
to be at least 22 Chinese stationed in Brazzaville. Although there is as yet no firm
evidence of any nondiplomatic
personnel except New China News
Agency representatives, additional officials and economic
technicians can probably be expected in the near future.

In July, Peiping extended a \$5-million, interest-free cash and commodity credit to Brazzaville, and this was followed by the announcement of a commercial agreement. A Brazzaville official also indicated late last month that the Chinese had expressed interest in financing a \$50-million rail-road project. All this can only lead to a further expansion of the Chinese presence on the north bank of the Congo River.

From the start the Chinese in Brazzaville have been in contact with CNL leaders and have apparently been generous in handing out propaganda. Shortly after the arrival of China's first chargé—a colonel who had served as military attaché in New Delhi—Maoist pamphlets were found on members of a CNL group

apprehended in Coquilhatville. There is no evidence to indicate that the arms of this or other CNL groups were supplied by the Chinese. In fact information on Chinese assistance, other than advice and propaganda publications, is sketchy and based in large part on reports originating with CNL members of questionable reliability. There are some suggestions that the Chinese are directly funding and feeding material to the editors of Dipanda, the vehemently anti-US weekly which more and more is becoming the Brazzaville regime's unofficial mouthpiece. At least two CNL members are said to have visited China in the winter of 1963-64 to seek financial support, but it is questionable how successful they were. The CNL seems to have been receiving some funds from abroad, but there is no proof that Peiping is the source of supply.

Chinese Activity in Burundi

The Chinese Embassy in Bujumbura, like the one in Brazzaville, has grown rapidly. A charge and three-man staff set up shop last winter. The ambassador arrived on 1 June, and by mid-August his staff had grown to at least 20.

The Burundi Government has apparently permitted consider-able clandestine cooperation on

3

its territory between Chinese and CNL leaders and probably also between Chinese and Tutsi refugees hostile to the Rwandan Government. A few of the Tutsis have reportedly received guerrilla training in China.

As in Brazzaville, the Chinese since their arrival have maintained close contact with rebel leaders. Last February Gaston Soumialot, a CNL leader from Brazzaville, established an exile branch headquarters at the Paguidas Hotel in Bujumbura, where the Chinese Embassy personnel were quartered. mialot and his followers reportedly received small sums of money from Chinese diplomats and passed out some propaganda in Kivu Province. By spring, however, the Chinese had apparently become disenchanted with Soumialot, who, they reportedly concluded, is a fumbling wastrel with little prospect of ever becoming an effective revolutionary leader. Peiping has continued to support him for lack of a more effective instrument, but as the Kivu uprising gained momentum the Chinese may have increased their backing for its leaders.

There have been occasional unconfirmed reports that Chinese from both Brazzaville and Burundi are directly involved in rebel operations within the Congo (Leopoldville). It seems likely that a few Chinese from the embassy in Bujumbura have been filtering through the porous border between Burundi and the Congo from time to time in order

to get first-hand information on the progress of the revolt and to dispense advice and assistance. Two Chinese were seen in Uvira in Kivu Province in mid-June by a Jesuit priest. In late August the first secretary of the Chinese Embassy in Bujumbura was expecting a Chinese official who was then in Kivu Province. These visits could be the basis for reports that Chinese officers are assigned to lead rebel forces in the field. Such information, however, should be treated with reserve. It is unlikely that Peiping has a corps of military advisers operating with rebel bands on any regular basis at this time.

Mulele and the Congo (Leopoldville)

Pierre Mulele, leader of the sizable revolt in his native Kwilu Province, is known to have had close contact with the Chinese. In 1961 he served as Cairo representative for Gizenga's dissident Stanleyville regime and left for China in March 1962 when that regime collapsed.

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4

Little other Chinese material has turned up within the Congo (Leopoldville), although Chinese Communist propaganda is occasionally seized and prisoners recently captured in Bukavu possessed Chinese guerrilla warfare booklets translated into English and French.

The Congo and the Sino-Soviet Dispute

In the broadest sense, the Chinese are seeking to exploit the Congo situation to demonstrate the validity of their thesis that armed struggle is the primary means by which the downtrodden can deal with imperialism, and are hopeful that rebel successes in the Congo will spark other revolts in southern Africa. Moreover, the Congo rebellion provides the Chinese with an opportunity to demonstrate Peiping's "wholehearted" support for militant revolutionary struggle, and they are exploiting this opportunity to belabor Moscow for its lack of revolutionary fervor. An

editorial in the 24 June People's Daily, the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, hailed rebel successes in the Congo as a lesson to Soviet revisionists who "shun revolutionary struggle" and oppose "China's thesis." The paper stated that independence, freedom, and equality can be won by "armed force and armed force alone. This has been and is the universal law of class struggle."

The Soviets have left themselves open to this kind of attack. Although they, like the Chinese, have been in contact with the rebels in Brazzaville and Bujumbura, they have shown great circumspection in their relations. Eastern European diplomats in Leopoldville report that, although the Soviets recognize their vulnerability to Chinese criticism, they take a cynical view of the dissension-ridden, venal, rebel groups and are reluctant to become deeply involved with them.

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5